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Abstract—Parameterized veriﬁcation of parameterized proto-
cols like cache coherence protocols is an important but hard prob-
lem. Our tool paraVeriﬁer handles this hard problem in a uniﬁed
framework: (1) it automatically discovers auxiliary invariants
and the corresponding causal relations from a small reference
instance of the veriﬁed protocol; (2) the above invariants and
causal relation information are automatically generalized into a
parameterized form to construct a parameterized formal proof
in a theorem prover (e.g., Isabelle). Our method is successfully
applied to typical benchmarks including snooping and directory
cache coherence protocol benchmarks. The correctness of these
protocols is guaranteed by a formal and readable proof which is
automatically generated. The notoriously hard FLASH protocol,
which is at an industrial scale, is also veriﬁed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Veriﬁcation of parameterized concurrent systems plays an
important role in the area of formal veriﬁcations, mainly due
to the practical importance of such systems. Parameterized
systems exist in many important application areas, including
cache coherence, security, and network communication proto-
cols. The hardness of parameterized veriﬁcation is mainly due
to the requirement of correctness that the desired properties
should hold in any instance of the parameterized system.
The degree of rigorousness and automation are two critical
aspects of approaches to parameterized veriﬁcation. The veriﬁ-
cation of real-world parameterized systems is, however, rarely
both rigorous and automatic. For instance, FLASH protocol
is the cache coherence protocol of the Stanford FLASH mut-
litprocessor [1]. This protocol is so complex that only a few
approaches [2], [3], [4], [5] have successfully veriﬁed it so far.
Furthermore, all existing successful veriﬁcation approaches
have their downsides. [2] is a theorem proving based approach
which requires to construct inductive invariants by hand. The
cases of [3] and [4] are similar to [2] that hand-crafted
invariants are required to provide by human experts. As a
contrast, [5] is a model checking based approach which can
be carried out automatically. However, the formal proof can
not be obtained from the work of [5]. In order to effectively
verify complex parameterized protocols like FLASH protocol,
there are two issues need to be addressed. The ﬁrst one is how
to ﬁnd a set of sufﬁcient and necessary invariants without (or
with less) human intervention, which is a core problem in this
ﬁeld. The second one is the rigorousness of the veriﬁcation.
It is preferable to formulate all the veriﬁcation in a publicly-
recognized trust-worthy framework like a theorem prover [4].
In order to solve the parameterized veriﬁcation in a both au-
tomatic and rigorous way, we design a tool called paraVeriﬁer,
which is based on a simple but elegant theory. Three kinds of
causal relations are introduced, which are essentially special
cases of the general induction rule. A so-called consistency
lemma is then proposed, which is the cornerstone of our
method. Notably, the theory foundation itself is veriﬁed as
a formal theory in Isabelle, which is the formal library for
verifying protocol case studies. The library provides basic
types and constant deﬁnitions to model protocol cases and
lemmas to prove properties.
Our tool paraVeriﬁer is composed of two parts: an invari-
ant ﬁnder invFinder and a proof generator proofGen.
Given a protocol P and a property inv, invFinder tries
to ﬁnd useful auxiliary invariants and causal relations which
are capable of proving inv. To construct auxiliary invari-
ants and causal relations, we employ heuristics inspired by
consistency relation. Also, when several candidate invariants
are obtained using the heuristics, we use oracles such as a
model checker and an SMT-solver to check each of them
under a small reference model of P , and chooses the one
that has been veriﬁed. After invFinder ﬁnds the auxiliary
invariants and causal relations, proofGen generalizes them
into parameterized forms, which are then used to construct
a completely parameterized formal proof in a theorem prover
(e.g., Isabelle) to model P and to prove the property inv. After
the base theory is imported, the generated proof is checked
automatically. Usually, a proof is done interactively. Special
efforts in the design of the proof generation are made in order
to make the proof checking automatic.
It is noteworthy that we make efforts to illustrate the
semantical intuition behinds these invariants. Thus our proof
product is not only a certiﬁcation of correctness, but also a
comprehensive analysis report of these protocols.
Related work There have been a lot of studies in the ﬁeld
of parameterized veriﬁcation [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [3], [4],
[11], [12], [13], [5]. Among them, the “invisible invariants”
method [8] is an automatic technique for parameterized veri-
ﬁcation. In this method, auxiliary invariants are computed in
a ﬁnite system instance to aid inductive invariant checking.
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The CMP method [4] adopts parameter abstraction and guard
strengthening to verify a safety property inv of a parameter-
ized system. An abstract instance of the parameterized protocol
is constructed by a counter-example-guided reﬁnement process
in an informal way. Recently, in [5], a BRAB algorithm is
implemented in an SMT-based model checker. It computes
over-approximations of backward reachable states that are
checked to be unreachable in the parameterized system.
II. PRELIMINARIES
There are three kinds of variables: 1) simple identiﬁer,
denoted by a string; 2) element of an array, denoted by a
string followed by a natural inside a square bracket. E.g.,
arr[i] indicates the ith element of the array arr; 3) ﬁled of a
record, denoted by a string followed by a dot and then another
string. E.g., rcd.f indicates the ﬁled f of the record rcd.
Each variable is associated with its type, which can be an
enumeration, natural number, and Boolean.
Expressions and formulas are deﬁned mutually recur-
sively. Expressions can be simple or compound. A simple
expression is either a variable or a constant while a com-
pound expression is constructed with the ite(if-then-else) form
f?e1 : e2, where e1 and e2 are expressions, and f is a formula.
A formula can be an atomic formula or a compound formula.
An atomic formula can be a boolean variable or constant, or
in the equivalence form e1
.
= e2, where e1 and e2 are two
expressions. A formula can also be constructed by using
the logic connectives, including negation (!), conjunction (),
disjunction (), implication ().
An assignment is a mapping from a variable to an expres-
sion, and is denoted with the assigning operation symbol “:=”.
A statement α is a set of assignments which are executed
in parallel, e.g., x1 := e1;x2 := e2; ...;xk := ek. If an
assignment maps a variable to a (constant) value, then we say it
is a value-assignment. We use α|x to denote the expression
assigned to x under the statement α. For example, let α be
{arr[1] := C;x := false}, then α|x returns false. A state
is an instantaneous snapshot of its behavior given by a set of
value-assignments.
For every expression e and formula f , we denote the value
of e (or f ) under an state s :: var ⇒ valueType as A[e, s]
(or B[f, s]). For the state s and a formula f , we write s |= f
to mean B[f, s] = true. Formal semantics of expressions and
formulas are given in HOL as usual, which is shown in [14].
For an expression e and a statement α = x1 := e1;x2 :=
e2; ...;xk := ek, we use vars(α) and eα to denote the variables
to be assigned {x1, x2, ...xk} and the expression transformed
from e by substituting each xi with ei simultaneously. Simi-
larly, for a formula f and a statement α = x1 := e1;x2 :=
e2; ...;xk := ek, we use fα to denote the formula transformed
from f by substituting each xi with ei. Moreover, fα can
be regarded as the weakest precondition of formula f w.r.t.
statement α, and we denote preCond(f, α) ≡ fα. Noting that a
state transition is caused by an execution of the statement, for-
mally, we deﬁne: s
α s′ ≡ (∀x ∈ vars(α).s′(x) = A[α|x, s])
∧(∀x /∈ vars(α).s′(x) = s(x)).
A rule r is a pair < g, α >, where g is a formula and is
called the guard of rule r, and α is a statement and is called
the action of rule r. For convenience, we denote a rule with
the guard g and the statement α as g  α. Also, we denote
act(g  α) ≡ α and pre(g  α) ≡ g. If the guard g is
satisﬁed at the state s, then α can be executed, thus, a new
state s′ is derived, and we say the rule g  α is triggered at
s, and transited to s′. Formally, we deﬁne: s r→ s′ ≡ s |=
pre(r) ∧ s act(r) s′.
A protocol P is a pair (I, R), where I is a set of formulas
and is called the initializing formula set, and R is a set of
rules. As usual, the reachable state set of protocol P = (I, R),
denoted as reachableSet(P), can be deﬁned inductively: (1) a
state s is in reachableSet(P) if there exists a formula f ∈ I ,
and s |= f ; (2) a state s is in reachableSet(P) if there exist
a state s0 and a rule r ∈ R such that s0 ∈ reachableSet(P)
and s0
r→ s.
A parameterized object(T) is simple a function from a
natural number to T, namely of type nat ⇒ T . For in-
stance, a parameterized formula pf is of type nat ⇒
formula, and we deﬁne forallForm(1, pf) ≡ pf(1), and
forallForm((n + 1), pf) ≡ forallForm(n, pf)  pf(n + 1).
existsForm(1, pf) ≡ pf(1), and existsForm((n + 1), pf) ≡
existsForm(n, pf)  pf(n+ 1).
Now we illustrate the above deﬁnitions by using a simple
mutual exclusion protocol with N nodes. Let I, T, C, and E
be enumerating values, x, n are simple and array variables,
N a natural number, pini(N) the predicate to specify the inial
state, prules(N) a HOL-notation to denote a set of the four
rules of the protocol, mutualInv(i, j) a property that n[i] and
n[j] cannot be C at the same time. We want to verify that
mutualInv(i, j) holds for any i ≤ N , j ≤ N s.t. i 
= j.
Example 1 will be used throughout the paper.
Example 1 Mutual-exclusion example.
assignN(i)≡n[i] .=I
pini(N) ≡ x .=true ∧ forallForm(N,assignN )
try(i) ≡ n[i] .= I  n[i] := T
crit(i) ≡ n[i] .= T∧ x .= true  n[i] := C; x := false
exit(i) ≡ n[i] .= C  n[i] := E
idle(i) ≡ n[i] .= E  n[i] := I; x := true
prules(N) ≡ {r. ∃ i. i ≤ N ∧( r=crit(i) ∨ r=exit(i)
∨ r=idle(i) ∨ r=try(i)}
mutualEx(N)≡ (pIni(N), prules(N))
mutualInv(i,j) ≡ ! (n[i] .= C  n[j] .= C)
III. CAUSAL RELATIONS AND CONSISTENCY LEMMA
A novel feature of our work lies in that three kinds of causal
relations are exploited, which capture whether and how the
execution of a particular protocol rule changes the protocol
state variables appearing in an invariant. Consider a rule r, a
formula f , and a formula set fs, three kinds of causal relations
are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 We deﬁne the following relations:
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• invHoldRule1(s, f, r) ≡s |= pre(r) −→ s |=
preCond(f, act(r));1
• invHoldRule2(s, f, r) ≡s |= f ←→ s |= preCond(f, (act(r));
• invHoldRule3(s, f, r, fs) ≡ ∃f ′ ∈ fs. (s |= (f ′ pre(r)) −→
s |= preCond(f, act(r)));
• invHoldRule(s, f, r, fs) ≡ s |= invHoldRule1(s, f, r) ∨ s |=
invHoldRule2(s, f, r) ∨ s |= invHoldRule3(s, f, r, fs).
The relation invHoldRule(s, f, r, fs) deﬁnes a causality
relation between f , r, and fs, which guarantees that if each
formula in fs holds before the execution of rule r, then f
holds after the execution of rule r. This includes three cases.
1) invHoldRule1(s, f, r) means that after rule r is executed,
f becomes true immediately; 2) invHoldRule2(s, f, r) states
that preCond(S, f) is equivalent to f , which intuitively means
that none of the state variables in f is changed, and the
execution of statement S does not affect the evaluation of
f ; 3) invHoldRule3(s, f, r, fs) states that there exist another
invariant f ′ ∈ fs such that the conjunction of the guard
of r and f ′ implies the precondition preCond(S, f). We can
also view invHoldRule1 3 as three special kinds of inductive
tactics, which can be applied to prove each formula in fs
holds at each inductive protocol rule cases. Note that the three
kinds of inductive tactics can be applied in a theorem prover,
which is the cornerstone of our work. Only after the theorem
prover is told which one among the three kinds of tactics is to
be used, it can prove automatically. Without the ﬁne-grained
classiﬁcation, the theorem prover cannot solve the proof tasks.
In the procedure of automatic proof generation, proofGen
generates proof scripts which contain enough application of
the three kinds of tactics and guide the theorem prover to
ﬁnish the proof.
With the invHoldRule relation, we deﬁne a consistency re-
lation consistent(invs, inis, rs) between a protocol (inis, rs)
and a set of invariants invs = {inv1, . . . , invn}.
Deﬁnition 2 A relation consistent(invs, inis, rs) holds if
the following conditions hold: (1) for all formulas inv ∈ invs
and ini ∈ inis and all states s, s |= ini implies s |= inv; (2)
for all formulas inv ∈ invs and rules r ∈ rs and all states
s, invHoldRule(s, inv, r, invs).
Example 2 Let us deﬁne a set of auxiliary invariants:
invOnXC(i) ≡ !(x .= true  n[i] .= C)
invOnXE(i) ≡! (x .= true n[i] .= E)
aux1(i,j) ≡! ( n[i] .= Cn[j] .= E)
aux2 (i,j) ≡! ( n[i] .= En[j] .= E)
pinvs(N)≡ {f. ∃ i1 i2. i1 ≤ N ∧ i2 ≤ N ∧
i1 = i2 ∧ f =mutualInv i1 i2
∨(∃ i1. i1 ≤ N ∧ f =invOnXC i1)
∨(∃ i1. i1 ≤ N ∧ f= invOnXE i1)
∨(∃ i1 i2. i1 ≤ N ∧ i2 ≤ N ∧ i1 = i2
∧ f = aux1 i1 i2)
∨(∃ i1 i2. i1 ≤ N ∧ i2 ≤ N ∧ i1 = i2
∧ f = aux2 i1 i2) }
In the following discussion, we assume that inv =
1Here −→ and ←→ are HOL connectives. Throughout this work, we use
HOL as our meta-logic, and embed our protocol description in HOL including
descriptions of rules and properties.
mutual(i1, i2), r = crit(iR1), rs = pinvs(N), and assump-
tions i1 ≤ N , i2 ≤ N , i1 
= i2, and iR1 ≤ N hold.
• invHoldRule3(s, inv, r, invs), where i1 = iR1. Since
invOnXC(i2) ∈ invs, preCond (act(r), inv) =!(C .=
C  n[i2] .= C), and s |= (invOnXC(i2)  pre(crit(iR1)))
implies s |=!(C .= C  n[i2] .= C).
• invHoldRule3(s, inv, r, invs), where i2 = iR1. Since
invOnXC(i1) ∈ invs, preCond (act(r), inv) =!(n[i1] .=
CC .= C), and s |= (invOnXC(i2)pre(crit(iR1))) implies
s |=!(n[i1] .= C  C .= C).
• invHoldRule2(s, inv, r), where i1 
= iR1, and i2 
= iR1,
since preCond(act(r), inv) = inv.
For any invariant inv ∈ invs, inv holds at a reachable
state s of a protocol P = (ini, rs) if the consistency relation
consistent(invs, inis, rs) holds. The following lemma formal-
izes the essence of the aforementioned causal relation, and is
called consistency lemma.
Theorem 1 If P = (ini, rs), consistent(invs, ini, rs), and
s ∈ reachableSet(P ), then for any inv ∈ invs, s |= inv.
Theorem 1 is our main tool to apply to prove. Let us
recall the proof goal set in Example 1: the mutual exclusion
property holds for each reachable state of the mutual-exclusion
protocol. In order to prove the goal, we prove a more general
result:
Lemma 2 If P = (pini(N), prules(N)) is the protocol
listed in example 1, s ∈ reachableSet(P ), and 0 < N , and
pinvs(N) is the set of formulas in example 2, then for any
inv s.t. inv ∈ pinvs(N), s |= inv.
Proof: By theorem 1, we only need to prove that
parts (1) and (2) of the relation consistent(pinvs(N),
pini(N), prules(N)) hold. Part (1) can be checked routine-
ly. Part (2) can be proved by case analysis on a formula
f ∈ invs and a rule r ∈ rs. Example 2 has checked one
case: f = mutual(i1, i2), r = crit(iR1). Other cases can be
analyzed similarly.
In order to apply the consistency lemma to prove that a
given property inv (e.g., the mutual exclusion property) holds
for each reachable state of a protocol P = (inis, rs) (e.g.,
mutual-exclusion protocol), we need to solve two problems.
First, we need to construct a set of auxiliary invariants invs
which contains inv and satisﬁes consistent(invs, inis, rs). By
applying the consistency lemma, we decompose the original
problem of invariant checking into that of checking the causal
relation between some f ∈ invs and r ∈ rs. The latter
needs case analysis on the form of f and r. Only if a proof
script contains sufﬁcient information on the case splitting and
the kind of causal relation to be checked in each subcase,
Isabelle can help us to automatically check it. How to generate
automatically such a proof, which can be run in Isabelle, is
the second problem.
Our solutions to the two problems are as follows: Given a
protocol, invFinder ﬁnds all the necessary ground auxiliary
invariants from a small instance of the protocol in Murphi.
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This step solves the ﬁrst problem. A table protocol.tbl
is worked out to store the set of ground invariants and causal
relations, which are then used by proofGen to create an
Isabelle proof script which models and veriﬁes the protocol
in a parameterized form. In this step, ground invariants are
generalized into a parameterized form, and accordingly ground
causal relations are adopted to create parameterized proof
commands which essentially proves the existence of the pa-
rameterized causal relations. This solves the second problem.
At last, the Isabelle proof script is fed into Isabelle to check
the correctness of the protocol.
IV. SEARCHING AUXILIARY INVARIANTS
Algorithm 1: Algorithm: invF inder
Input: Initially given invariants F , a protocol P =< I,R >
Output: A set of tuples which represent causal relations
between concrete rules and invariants:
1 A ← F ;
2 tuples ← [];
3 newInvs ← F ;
4 while newInvs is not empty do
5 f ← newInvs.dequeue;
6 for r ∈ R do
7 paras ← Policy(r, f);
8 for para ∈ paras do
9 cr ← apply(r, para);
10 newInvOpt, rel ← coreFinder(cr, f, A);
11 tuples ← tuples@[< r, para, f, rel >];
12 if newInvOpt = NONE then
13 newInv ← get(newInvOpt);
14 newInvs.enqueue(newInv);
15 A ← A ∪ {newInv};
16 return tuples;
Given a protocol P and a property set F containing invariant
formulas we want to verify, invFinder aims to ﬁnd useful
auxiliary invariants and causal relations which are capable of
proving any element in F . A set A is used to store all the
invariants found up to now, and is initialized as F . A queue
newInvs is used to store new invariants which have not been
checked, and is initialized as F . A relation table tuples is
used to record the causal relation between a parameterized rule
in some parameter setting and a concrete invariant. Initially,
tuples are set as NULL. invFinder works iteratively in a semi-
proving and semi-searching way. In each iteration, the head
element f of newInvs is popped, then Policy(r, f) generates
groups of parameters paras according to r and f by some
policy. For each parameter para in paras, it is applied to
instantiate r into a concrete rule cr. Here apply(r, para) =
r if r contains no array-variables and para = []; oth-
erwise apply(r, para) = r(para[1], ..., para[|para|]). Then
coreF inder(cr, f, A) is called to check whether a causal
relation exists between cr and f ; if there is such one relation
item, the relation item rel and a formula option newInvOpt
is returned; otherwise a run-time error occurs in coreF inder,
which indicates no proof can be found. In the ﬁrst case, a tuple
< r, para, f, rel > will be inserted into tuples; If the formula
option newInvOpt is NONE, then no new invariant formula
is generated; otherwise newInvOpt = Some(f ′) for some
formula f ′, then get(newInvOpt) returns f ′, and the new
invariant formula f ′ will be pushed into the queue newInvs
and inserted into the invariant set A. The above searching
process is executed until newInvs becomes empty. At last,
the table tuples is returned.
Here we still use the mutual exclusion protocol to illustrate
the main ideas of invFinder. Let P = (pini(N), prules(N))
is the protocol listed in example 1, f = mutualInv(1, 2), and
F = {f}. The output of Algorithm 1 is to construct useful
auxiliary invariants in example 2 and causal relations used in
Lemma 2. By this example, the parameter generation policy
Policy and the core invariant searching function coreFinder
will be illustrated in Section IV-A and IV-B.
A. Parameter Generation Policy
Let r = crit(i) be a parameterized rule. An important
research question is: How many groups of rule parameters are
needed to instantiate r into concrete rules? The answer will
determine how to compute the auxiliary invariants and causal
relations between these concrete rules and f for generating
a proof. For instance, [1], [2], and [3] are three groups
to instantiate r into crit(1), crit(2), and crit(3). However,
we need to know, are these three groups of concrete rules
sufﬁcient to compute the necessary auxiliary invariants and
causal relations, and do we need another group parameter
[4] to instantiate r. Roughly speaking, after the generation
of concrete rules according to the policy, enough auxiliary
invariants and causal relations should be computed to gen-
erate a proof a shown in Lemma 2. In detail, through the
computation of coreFinder(cr, f, A) by using crit(1), crit(2)
and crit(3) with f , adopting the information generated from
the generated auxiliary invariants and causal relations should
derive a proof of case on f and crit in Example 2 which also
involves three subcases. Here [4] is not necessary because [3]
and [4] are “equivalent” by our Policy. Let us explain the
reason as follows.
In order to formulate the main ideas of our parameter
generation policy, we introduce the concept of permutation
modulo to symmetry relation nm, and a quotient set of
permsnm (the set of all n-permutations of m) under the relation.
Here an n-permutation of m is ordered arrangement of an n–
element subset of an m-element set I = {i.0 < i ≤ m}. We
use a list xs with size n to stand for an n-permutation of
m. For instance, [1, 2] is a 2-permutation of 3. xs[i] and |xs|
denote the i−th element and the length of xs respectively. If
xs[i] = i for all i ≤ |xs|, we call it identical permutation.
Deﬁnition 3 Let m and n be two natural numbers, where
n ≤ m, L and L′ are two n-permutations of m,
1) L ∼nm L′ ≡ (|L| = |L′| = n) ∧ (∀i.i < |L| ∧ L[i] ≤
m− n −→ L[i] = L′[i]).
2) L nm L′ ≡ L ∼nm L′ ∧ L′ ∼nm L.
3) semiP(m,n, S) ≡ (∀L ∈ permsnm∃L′ ∈ S.L nm L′) ∧
(∀L ∈ S.∀L′ ∈ S.L 
= L′ −→ ¬(L nm L′).
4) A set S is called a quotient of the set permsnm under the
relation nm if semiP(m,n, S).
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The deﬁnition of relation nm (item 1 and 2 in Deﬁnition 3)
directly leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 3 If L nm+n L′, then for any 0 < i ≤ |L|, any
0 < j ≤ m, L[i] = j if and only if L′[i] = j.
For instance, let L = [2, 3] and L′ = [2, 4], then L 24 L′. Due
to Lemma 3, we can analyze a group of concrete parameters by
analyzing only one of them as a representative. Keeping this
in mind, let us look at the following lemma, which together
with Lemma 3 is the theoretical basis of our policy.
Lemma 4 Let S be a set s.t. semiP(m,n, S),
1) for any L ∈ permsnm, there exists a L′ ∈ S s.t. L nm L′.
2) let L ∈ S, L′ ∈ S, if L 
= L′, then there exists two indices
i ≤ m and j ≤ n such that L[i] = j and L′[i] 
= j.
Lemma 4 shows 1) completeness of S w.r.t. the set permsnm
under the relation , 2) the distinction between two different
elements in S. Therefore, S has covered all analysing patterns
according to the aforementioned comparing scheme between
elements of L with numbers j < n −m. Moreover, the case
patterns represented by different elements in S are different
from each other. This fact can be illustrated by the following
example.
Example 3 Let m = 3, n = 1, S = {[1], [2], [3]} and
semiP(m,n, S), let LR be an element in S, there are three
cases:
1) LR = [1]: it is a special case where LR[1] = 1;
2) LR = [2]: it is a special case where LR[1] = 2;




Notice that the above cases are mutually disjoint and their
disjunction is a tautology. Besides, [3] and [4] and both special
cases where LR[1] 
= 1 and LR[1] 
= 2, and [3] 13 [4]. This is
the reason why [4] is not needed to be chosen to instantiate
crit.
In Algorithm 1, a concrete formula cinv is popped from
the queue newInvs, which can be seen as a normalized
instantiation of some parameterized formula pinv.
Deﬁnition 4 A concrete invariant formula cinv is normal-
ized w.r.t a parameterized invariant pinv if there exists no
array variable in cinv and pinv = cinv or there exists an
identical permutation LI with |LI| > 0 such that cinv =
pinv(1, ... |LI|);
For instance, the concrete formula !(n[1] .= C  n[2] .= C)
is obtained by instantiating mutualInv(i1, i2) with [1, 2]. Let
cinv be a normalized concrete invariant w.r.t. a parameterized
invariant pinv, pr be a parameterized rule, m be the number
of actual parameters occurring in cinv, and n be the number
of formal parameters occurring in pr, our policy is to compute
a quotient of permsnm, denoted as cmpSemiperm(m + n, n),
and use its elements as a group of parameters to instantiate
pr into a set crs of concrete rules.2 For instance, for the
2the details of computing cmpSemiperm(m+n, n) can be found in [14].
invariant !(n[1] .= C  n[2] .= C) (or mutualInv(1, 2)), three
groups of parameters [1], [2], [3] are used to instantiate crit
respectively. Each of the instantiation results will be used
to check which kind of causal relation exists between the
invariant and each one of the resulting concrete rules. The
checking work is accomplished by coreFinder, which is
illustrated in the following subsection.
B. Core Searching Algorithm
For a cinv and a rule r ∈ crs, the core part of the invFinder
tool is shown in Algorithm 2. It needs to call two oracles.
The ﬁrst one, denoted by chk, checks whether a ground
formula is an invariant. Such an oracle can be implemented by
translating the formula into a formula in NuSMV, and calling
NuSMV as the model checking engine to check whether it is
an invariant in a given small reference model of the protocol. If
the reference model is too small to check the invariant, then
the formula will be checked by Murphi in a big reference
model. The second oracle, denoted by tautChk, checks
whether a formula is a tautology. Such a tautology checker
is implemented by translating the formula into a form in the
SMT (SAT Modulo Theories) format, and checking it by an
SMT solver such as Z3.
Algorithm 2: Core Searching Algorithm: coreF inder
Input: r, inv, invs
Output: A formula option f , a new causal relation rel
1 g ←the guard of r, S ←the statement of r;
2 inv′ ← preCond(inv, S);
3 if inv = inv′ then
4 relItem ← (r, inv, invRule2,−);
5 return (NONE, relItem);
6 else if tautChk(g → inv′) = true then
7 relItem ← (r, inv, invRule1,−);
8 return (NONE, relItem);
9 else
10 candidates ← subsets(decompose(dualNeg(inv′)  g));
11 newInv ← choose(chk, candidates);
12 relItem ← (r, inv, invRule3, newInv);
13 if isNew(newInv, invs) then
14 newInv ← normalize(newInv);
15 return (SOME(newInv), relItem);
16 else
17 return (NONE, relItem);
Input parameters of Algorithm 2 include a rule instance
r, an invariant inv, a sets of invariants invs. The sets invs
stores the auxiliary invariants constructed up to now. The
algorithm searches for new invariants and constructs the causal
relation between the rule instance r and the invariant inv. The
algorithm returns a formula option and a causal relation item
between r and inv. A formula option value NONE indicates
that no new invariant is found while SOME(f) indicates a new
auxiliary invariant f is searched.
Algorithm coreF inder works as follows: after computing
the pre-condition inv′ (line 2), which is the weakest precon-
dition of the input formula inv w.r.t. S, the algorithm takes
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further operations according to the cases it faces with:
(1) If inv = inv′, meaning that statement S does not change
inv, then no new invariant is created, and new causal relation
item marked with tag invHoldRule2 is recorded between r
and inv.
(2) If tautChk veriﬁes that g  inv′ is a tautology, then
no new invariant is created, and the new causal relation item
marked with tag invHoldRule1 is recorded between r and inv.
(3) If neither of the above two cases holds, then a new
auxiliary invariant newInv will be constructed, which will
make the causal relation invHoldRule3 to hold. The candi-
date set is subsets(decompose(dualNeg(inv′)  g)), where
decompose(f) decompose f into a set of sub-formulas fi such
that each fi is not of a conjunction form and f is semantically
equivalent to f1  f2  ...  fN . dualNeg(!f) returns f .
subsets(S) denotes the power set of S. A proper formula is
chosen from the candidate set to construct a new invariant
newInv. This is accomplished by the choose function,
which calls the oracle chk to verify whether a formula is
an invariant in the given reference model. After newInv is
chosen, the function isNew checks whether this invariant is
new w.r.t. newInvs or invs. If this is the case, the invariant
will be normalized, and then be added into newInvs, and
the new causal relation item marked with tag invRule3
will be added into the causal relations. The meaning of
the word “new” is modulo to the symmetry relation. E.g.,
mutualInv(1, 2) is equivalent to mutualInv(2, 1).
TABLE I
A FRAGMENT OF OUTPUT OF invFinder
rule ruleParas inv causal relation f’
crit [1] mutualInv(1,2) invHoldRule3 invOnXC(2)
crit [2] mutualInv(1,2) invHoldRule3 invOnXC(1)
crit [3] mutualInv(1,2) invHoldRule2
Let us continue the example in the end of subsection IV-A.
After the three iterations of computations of coreFinder on
crit(1), crit(2), crit(3) with mutualInv(1, 2), the according
output of the invFinder, which is stored in ﬁle mutual.tbl,
is shown in Table I. In the table, each line records the index of
a normalized invariant, name of a parameterized rule, the rule
parameters to instantiate the rule, a causal relation between the
ground invariant and a kind of causal relation which involves
the kind and proper formulas f ′ in need (which are used to
construct causal relations invHoldRule3).
Notice that there is a close correspondence between the
three lines in table I and the three case analysis in example 2.
Each line in table I is a special one of the cooresponding case
in Example 2 if we instantiate iR1 with LR1, and i1 with 1,
and i2 with 2 respectively. Can we generalize the information
in the lines on concrete invariants and causal relations into
symbolic ones which are key to generate proofs as shown in
Example 2?
V. GENERALIZATION
Intuitively, generalization means that a concrete index (for-
mula or rule) is generalized into a set of concrete indices (for-
mulas or rules), which can be formalized by a symbolic index
(formula or rules) with side conditions speciﬁed by constraint
formulas. In order to do this, we adopt a new constructor to
model symbolic index or symbolic value symb(str), where str
is a string. We use N to denote symb(”N”), which formalizes
the size of a parameterized protocol instance. A concrete index
i can be transformed into a symbolic one by some special
strategy g, namely symbolize(g, i) = symb(g(i)). In this work,
two special transforming function fInv(i) = ”iInv”ˆitoa(i)
and fIr(i) = ”iR”ˆitoa(i), where itoa(i) is the standard
function transforming an integer i into a string. We use special
symbols ii to denote symbolize(fInv, i); and iRi to denote
symbolize(fIr, i). The former formalizes a symbolic param-
eter of a parameterized formula, and the latter a symbolic
parameter of a parameterized rule. Accordingly, we deﬁne
symbolize2f(g, inv) (or symbolize2r(g, r)), which returns the
symbolic transformation result to a concrete formula inv (or
rule r) by replacing a concrete index i occurring in inv (or r)
with a symbolic index symbolize(g, i).
There are two main kinds of generalization in our work: (1)
generalization of a normalized invariant into a symbolic one.
The resulting symbolic invariants are used to create deﬁnitions
of invariant formulas in Isabelle. For instance, !(x .= true 
n[1] .= C) is generalized into !(x .= true  n[i1] .= C). This
kind of generalization is done with model constraints, which
speciﬁes that any parameter index should be not greater than
the instance size N, and parameters to instantiate a parameter-
ized rule (formula) should be different. (2) The generalization
of concrete causal relations into parameterized causal relations
in Isabelle, which will be used in proofs of the existence of
causal relations in Isabelle.
Since the ﬁrst kind of generalization is simple, we focus
on the second kind of generalization, which consists of two
phases. Firstly, groups of rule parameters such as [[1],[2],[3]]





= i2, (iR1 
= i1) ∧ (iR1 
= i2)]3 ,
which stands for case-splittings by comparing a symbolic rule
parameter iR1 and invariant parameters i1 and i2. In the
second phase, the formula ﬁeld accompanied with a relation of
kind invHoldRule3 is also generalized by some special strategy.
Now let us look at the ﬁrst phase, starting with some
deﬁnitions. Consider a line of concrete causal relation shown
in Table I, there is a group of rule parameters LR, and a group
of parameters LI occurring in an invariant formula.
Deﬁnition 5 Let LR and LI be two permutations which
represent rule parameters and invariant parameters, we deﬁne:
• symbolic comparison condition generalized from comparing
LR[i] and LI[j] : symbCmp(LR,LI, i, j) ≡{
iRi
.
= ij if LR[i] = LI[j] (1)
iRi 
= ij otherwise (2)
• symbolic comparison condition generalized from comparing
LR[i] and with all LI[j] : symbCaseI(LR,LI, i) ≡
3iR1 = i1 is the abbreviation of !(iR1 .= i1)
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{
symbCmp(LR,LI, i, j) if ∃!j.LR[i] = LI[j] (3)
forallForm(|LI|, pf) otherwise (4)
where pf(j) = symbCmp(LR,LI, i, j), and ∃!j.P is a
qualiﬁer denoting there exists an unique j s.t. property P ;
• symbolic case generalized from comparing LR with LI :
symbCase(LR,LI) ≡ forallForm(|LR|, pf), where pf(i) =
symbCaseI(LR,LI, i);
• symbolic partition generalized from comparing all LRS[k]
with LI , where LRS is a list of permutations with the
same length: partition(LRS,LI) ≡ existsForm(|LRS|, pf),
where pf(i) = symbCase(LRSi, LI).
symbCmp(LR,LI, i, j) deﬁnes a symbolic formula general-
ized from comparing LR[i] and LI[j]; symbCaseI(LR,LI, i)
a symbolic formula summarizing the results of com-
parison between LR[i] and all LI[j] such that j ≤
|LI|; symbCase(LR,LI) a symbolic formula representing
a subcase generalized from comparing all LR[i] and al-
l LI[j]; partition(LRS,LI) is a disjunction of subcases
symbCase(LRS[i], LI). Recall the three lines in Table. I:
• when LR = [1], symbCmp(LR,LI, 1, 1) = (iR1
.
= i1),
symbCase(LR,LI) = symbCaseI(LR,LI, 1) = (iR1
.
= i1)
becuase LR[1] = LI[1].
• when LR = [2], symbCmp(LR,LI, 1, 2) = (iR1
.
= i2),
symbCase(LR,LI) = symbCaseI(LR,LI, 2) = (iR1
.
= i2)
becasue LR[1] = LI[2].
• when LR = [3], symbCmp(LR,LI, 1, 1) = (iR1 
= i1),
symbCmp(LR,LI, 1, 2) = (iR1 
= i2),
symbCase(LR,LI) = symbCaseI(LR,LI, 1) = (iR1 
=
i1) ∧ (iR1 
= i2) because neither LR[1] = LI[1] nor
LR[1] = LI[2].





= i2) ∨ ((iR1 
= i1) ∧ (iR1 
= i2))
The second phase of generalization of concrete causal
relations is to generalize the formula inv′ accompanied with
a causal relation invHoldRule3 in a line of table I. An index
occurring in f ′ can either occur in the invariant formula, or in
the rule. We need to look it up to determine the transformation.
Deﬁnition 6 Let LI and LR are two permutations,
ﬁnd ﬁrst(L, i) returns the least index j s.t. L[i] = j if there
exists such an index; otherwise returns an error.
lookup(LI, LR, i) ≡
{
ifind first(LI,i) if i ∈ LI (5)
iRfind first(LR,i) otherwise(6)
After the second phase of the generalization, the symbolic
cases and the according causal relations on rule crit and
mutualInv, which are transferred from Table I in Table II.
Here r = crit(iR1), and f = mutualInv(i1, i2).
VI. AUTOMATIC GENERATION OF ISABELLE PROOF
A formal model for a protocol in a theorem prover like
Isabelle includes the deﬁnitions of constants and rules and
invariants, lemmas, and proofs. Readers can refer to [14]
for detailed illustration of the formal proof script. In this
TABLE II
THE RESULT OF GENERALIZING LINES OF TABLE I
rule inv case causal relation f’
r f iR1
.
= i1 invHoldRule3 invOnXC(i2)
r f iR1
.
= i2 invHoldRule3 invOnXC(i1)
r f (iR1 = i1)∧
(iR1 = i2) invHoldRule2
section, we focus on the generation of a lemma critVsinv14
on the existence of causal relation between rule crit(iR1)
and invariant mutualInv(i1, i2) basing on the aforementioned
information listed in the Table. II.
In order to generate a lemma such as critVsinv1, proofGen
needs the following two kinds of key information: name and
parameters of crit and mutualInv, the case analysis and the
according sunproofs for the sub-cases. The former can be
provided by the result information derived from the ﬁrst kind
of generation. The latter can be provided by the symbolic
causal table listed in Table II. Due to length limitation, we
illustrate the algorithm for generating a key part of the proof
of the lemma critVsinv1: the generation of a subproof
(e.g., lines 7-8) according to a symbolic relation tag of
invHoldRule1−3, which is shown in Algorithm 3. Input relTag
is a symbolic causal relation listed in a line of table after
generalization, e.g., the ﬁrst line listed in Table II.
1lemma critVsinv1:
2 assumes a1: ∃ iR1. iR1 ≤ N ∧ r=crit iR1 and
a2: ∃i1 i2. i1≤N ∧ i2 ≤ N ∧ i1=i2 ∧ f=inv1 i1 i2
3 shows invHoldRule s f r (invariants N)
4 proof -
from a1 obtain iR1 where a1:iR1 ≤ N ∧ r=crit iR1
by blast
from a2 obtain i1 i2 where a2: i1 ≤ N
∧ i2 ≤ N ∧ i1 = i2 ∧ f=inv1 i1 i2
by blast
5 have iR1=i1 ∨ iR1=i2 ∨ (iR1 = i1 ∧ iR1 = i2)
by auto
6 moreover{assume b1:iR1=i1
7 have invHoldRule3 s f r (invariants N)
proof(cut_tac a1 a2 b1, simp,
rule_tac x=! (x=true  n[i2]=C) in exI,auto)qed
8 then have invHoldRule s f r (invariants N) by auto}
9 moreover{assume b1:iR1=i2
10 have invHoldRule3 s f r (invariants N)
proof(cut_tac a1 a2 b1, simp,
rule_tac x=! (x=true  n[i1]=C in exI,auto)qed
11 then have invHoldRule s f r (invariants N) by auto}
12 moreover{assume b1:(iR1 = i1 ∧ iR1 = i2)
13 have invHoldRule2 s f r
proof(cut_tac a1 a2 b1, auto) qed
14 then have invHoldRule s f r (invariants N) by auto}
15ultimately show invHoldRule s f r (invariants N) by blast
16qed
In the body of function rel2proof, sprintf writes a formatted
data to string and returns it. In line 10, getFormField(relTag)
returns the ﬁeld of formula f ′ if relTag = invHoldRule3(f ′).
rel2proof transforms a symbolic relation tag into a paragraph
of proof. For instance, the subproofs shown in lines 7-8,
10-11, and 13-14 in the Lemma critVsinv1 is generated
according to the 1st, 2snd, and 3rd lines in Table II. If the
tag is among invHoldRule1−2, the transformation is rather
4Each computed invariant will be referenced by an internal index i in
proofGen, and mutualInv’s index is 1. Thus inv1 is the name for mutualInv
to print.
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Algorithm 3: Generating a kind of proof which is accord-
ing with a relation tag of invHoldRule1−3 : rel2proof
Input: A symbolic causal relation item relTag
Output: An Isablle proof: proof
1 if relTag = invHoldRule1 then
2 proof ← sprintf
3 ”have invHoldRule1 f r (invariants N)
4 by(cut tac a1 a2 b1, simp, auto)
5 then have invHoldRule f r (invariants N) by blast” ;
6 else if relTag = invHoldRule2 then
7 proof ← sprintf
8 ”have invHoldRule2 f r (invariants N) by(cut tac a1 a2
b1, simp, auto)
9 then have invHoldRule f r (invariants N) by blast” ;
10 else
11 f ′ ← getFormField(relTag);
12 proof ← sprintf
13 ”have invHoldRule3 f r (invariants N)
14 proof(cut tac a1 a2 b1, simp, rule tac x=%s in
exI,auto)qed
15 then have invHoldRule f r (invariants N) by blast”
(symbf2Isabelle f’)”;
16 return proof
straight-forward, otherwise the form f ′ is assigned by the
formula getFormField(relTag), and provided to tell Isabelle
the formula which is used to construct the invHoldRule3
relation.
VII. EXPERIMENTS
We implement our tool in Ocaml. Experiments are done
with typical snooping cache coherence protocol benchmarks
such as MESI and MOESI protocol, as well as directory cache
coherence protocol benchmarks such as German and FLASH
protocol. The detailed codes and experiment data can be
found in [14]. Each experiment data includes the paraVeriﬁer
instance, invariant sets, and Isabelle proof scripts. Experiment
results are summarized in Table III. Among them, German
protocol was posted as a challenge to the formal veriﬁcation
community by Steven German, and FLASH protocol is a real-
world protocol at an industrial scale.
It is the construction of causal relation with readable in-
variants that differs our work from any previous work. In
detail, the invariants have a clean and neat semantics, which
reﬂect the deep insight of the protocol design. Moreover, we
generalize these concrete invariants and causal relations into
a parameterized proof, and generate a parameterized proof in
Isabelle. The readable Isabelle proof script formally proves
these invariants. In this way, these proof scripts with easily
readable invariants in our work establish “a chain of evidence”
for the correctness of the protocol. Thus, we gain with the
highest assurance for the design of the protocol. To the best of
knowledge, this work for the ﬁrst time automatically generates
a proof of safety properties of full version of FLASH in a
theorem prover without auxiliary invariants manually provided
by people.
TABLE III
VERIFICATION RESULTS ON BENCHMARKS.
Protocols #rules #invariants time (sec.) Memory (MB)
mutualEx 4 5 3.25 7.3
MESI 4 3 2.47 11.5
MOESI 5 3 2.49 23.2
German [4] 13 52 38.67 14
FLASH nodata 60 152 280 26
FLASH data 62 162 510 26
VIII. CONCLUSION
Within paraVeriﬁer, we provide an automatic framework
for parameterized veriﬁcation of cache coherence protocol,
The originality of using paraVeriﬁer to verify a protocol lies
in the following aspects: (1) instead of creating the needed
auxiliary invariants manually, we use invFinder to generate
automatically these invariants, which is guided by the heuris-
tics to construct a consistent relation to apply the consistency
lemma. (2) instead of formally proving veriﬁcation goals by
hand, we use proofGen to generate automatically proofs to
prove the correctness of the protocol. The ultimate correctness
of the protocol design is guaranteed by the formally readable
proof. Therefore, we can verify the protocol in both an
automatic and rigorous way.
As we demonstrate in this work, combining theorem proving
with automatic proof generation is promising in the ﬁeld of
formal veriﬁcation of industrial protocols. Theorem proving
can guarantee the rigorousness of the veriﬁcation results, while
automatic proof generation can release the burden of human
interaction.
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